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Abs t ract
Thi s paper  exam ines bot h pay r elati vi t i es and m echanism s f or  pay det ermi nat i on wi t hi n t he UK 
academ ic l abour  ma r ket   draw ing upon a part i cularl y det ail ed dat a set  of  635  academ ics f r om   f i ve 
t r adit i onal  Scot t i sh U niversit i es. I n t he exi sti ng l i t erature, the fact that  in m any occupat i ons,  
em ployees are paid accordi ng t o expl i cit l y det ermi ned w age scal es is m ostl y i gnored. W e
em ploy sal ary,  grade and spinal  poi nt  i nforma t i on t o i ncorporate the fi xed fr am ew ork of
academ ic salari es int o analysi s. Ou r  result s out l i ne t he i m port ance of i ndi vi dual  product i vi t y,  
m easured t hrough  publ i cati on,   grant  r eceipt   and  t eaching  skil l ,   i n  att r acti ng  f i nanci al  r ew ard.   We  
find a l arge penal t y associated wi t h t i me   out   of  t he profession and evidence f or  t he deregul ati on 
of  establi shed pay and prom ot i on str uct ures. In order  t o i dent i f y t hose academ ics mo s t   l i kel y t o 
l eave the profession,  analysi s also consi ders the det ermi nant s of i ndi vi dual s’ reservat i on and
deserved salary.   Cont r ol l i ng f or  i ndi vi dual   characteri sti cs we   f i nd t hat   l ecturers hol d t he l ow est  
r eservat i on salari es i n r elati on t o t hei r   curr ent  salary l evel.   The  academ ic profession i s t herefore 
mo s t   at  r i sk f r om  l oosi ng  i t s staff   at  t hi s grade.  We   f i nd how ever  no ( self-) selecti on on t he basi s 
of  t he product i vi t y of  i ndi vi dual s. 
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1  We   wi sh t o  t hank  our  coll eagues  at  I ZA,   and  t he  sem inar- part i cipant s at  Lei cester  Un i versit y,   E ssex Un i versit y  and 
ESPE  2000,   Bonn,   f or  val uabl e  c o mme n t s and  hel pful   di scussions.2
1.   Introduction
The Hay r eport  (1997) revealed that  over the previous 10 years, uni versit y pay dropped by as 
mu c h   as 20%  i n r eal  t erms ,   f all i ng behi nd com parable professions i n t he publ i c sector.   D eari ng 
( 1997)  confi r me d   t hi s t r end,   advi sing t hat   alt hough academ ic r em unerati on shoul d be suff i cient 
t o recrui t ,  r etain and m ot i vat e staff  of t he requi r ed qual i t y,  t he m aj ori t y of staff  i n hi gher 
educati on w ere in fact pai d subst anti all y bel ow  com parable pri vat e and publ i c sector rates. 
Al t hough one m i ght  argue t hat  academ ics are int erested in m ore than m ere pecuniary rew ard, 2
l ong-t erm  underpaym ent  ma y  s p a r k t he drain of hi gh qual i t y i ndi vi dual s fr om  academ ia int o
mo r e lucrati ve posi t i ons i n t he pri vat e sector,  or to academ ic posi t i ons abroad.  St r i kes over pay 
duri ng  1996  and  1999  we r e suggest i ve  of  a profession  on  t he  edge  of  t hei r   salary  t hreshol d.
Wi t hi n t he cont ext of the academ ic underpaym ent  debat e, the adequacy of the rem unerati on
str uct ure curr entl y i n pl ace has been held t o quest i on.   E stabli shm ent level academ ic salari es,  at 
l east  bel ow  professori al  grades,  r em ain f orma l l y set  t hrough a nat i onal l y negot i ated f i xed salary 
str uct ure agreed bet w een t he A ssociati on of  Un i versit y Teachers ( AUT)   and t he Un i versit y and 
Col l ege’s E m ployers A ssociati on (UCEA) .  Wi t hi n t hi s forma l  fr am ew ork,  staff  progression i s 
l argel y aut om at i c and dependent  on years of wo r k.  Wi t h t he em ergence of t he research and
t eaching assessm ent exercises and the dram ati c increase in st udent  num bers over recent years, 
t he i m port ance of  publ i cati on and adm ini str ati ve  r esponsi bi l i t y  wi t hi n  t he  academ ic j ob  has  been 
consol i dat ed. It  is uncl ear,  how ever,  wh e t her the curr ent rew ard system  adequately recogni ses 
i ndi vi dual   product i vi t y.  
Thi s paper  exam ines bot h pay r elati vi t i es and m echanism s f or  pay det erm inat i on wi t hi n t he UK 
academ ic profession and ai ms  t o provi de som e vi sibi l i t y i nt o academ ic rew ard.  We  u t i l i se a 
uni que cross secti onal  dat aset,  wh i ch incl udes det ail ed informa t i on on sal ary and grade of the 
academ ic staff  of fi ve ol d est abli shed uni versit i es. An  i m port ant feature of the dat a is that  it  
i ncl udes m easures for i ndi vi dual  r esearch product i vi t y.  Such det ail ed data is scarce in t he
existi ng  l i t erature i n  t hi s area.  I n  t he  f i r st  step of  our  analysi s,  we   em ploy  salary,   grade and  spinal  
poi nt  informa t i on t o i ncorporate the fi xed fr am ew ork of salary scales int o analysi s. Al t hough
2 A cadem ics have aft er all  undert aken peri ods of extended st udy relati ve t o t he general l abour force at an
opport uni t y cost  of perhaps consi derable foregone earni ngs.  For  furt her di scussion of non pecuni ary rew ard see 
Wa r d  and  Sl oane  ( 1999).3
t here exists an extensive l i t erature on pay schem es,  t he f act  t hat   i n m any occupat i ons em ployees 
are paid accordi ng t o expl i cit l y det ermi ned w age scal es is m ostl y i gnored. Ou r   f r am ew ork 
all ow s  us  t o  consi der  t he  eff ect  of  pol i cy-changes t o  t he  curr ent  system  of  academ ic r ew ard,   such 
as changing t he w age rates w it hi n t he fi xed fr am ew ork,  or t he eff ect of changing t he fi xed
f r am ew ork i t self .I n t he second st ep of our analysi s, w e i nvest i gat e the det ermi nant s of
academ ics’  deserved and r eservat i on salary wi t h t he aim  of  i dent i f yi ng t he mo s t   m obi l e and/ or 
mo s t  di ssati sfi ed staff  wi t hi n t he profession.  Al t hough t he m obi l i t y of staff  in and out  of the 
academ ic sector  mi ght   be  benefi cial  t o  som e extent,   t he  profession  shoul d  ensure i t s capabil i t y  t o 
r etain  t he  best   and  mo s t   product i ve  i ndi vi dual s.  We   wi l l   t r y  t o  i dent i f y  t hose  w ho  are mo s t   at  r i sk 
f r om   bei ng  l ost   t o  t he  profession.
The r em ainder of the paper is str uct ured as fol l ow s:  Secti on 2 sum m ari zes previous l i t erature 
r elevant  t o our  analysi s and secti on 3 out l i nes t he ma i n characteri sti cs of  t he dat aset  used i n t hi s 
paper.   Secti on 4 i nt r oduces our  m odel ,   wh i ch incorporates t he f i xed f r am ew ork of  salary scales, 
f or the analysi s of the det ermi nant s of actual  academ ic salary.  Secti on 5 consi ders a m odel  of 
deserved  and r eservat i on  salary.   Secti on  6  concl udes.
2.   Previous  l i t erature
Un t i l  recentl y t here had been vi r t ual l y no w ork w ri t t en on pay w i t hi n t he Bri t i sh academ ic 
profession.   The  l ack of  det ail ed dat a on academ ics i n t he UK  has provi ded a hurdl e f or  pot enti al 
r esearchers. Na t i onal  stati sti cs, coll ected by t he U ni versit i es Stati sti cal R ecord and t he H i gher 
Educati onal  St ati sti cs A gency, cont ain onl y very l i mi t ed informa t i on.  The census of academ ic 
salari es coll ected dat a on  gender,   age,  dat e of  r ecrui t me n t ,   r ank,   f acult y  and  salary,   but   ceased i n 
1993.   Ba i mb r i dge  and  Si m pson  ( 1996)  m odel   t he  f i nanci al  r em unerati on  of  vi ce chancell ors and 
pri nci pal s at UK h i gher inst i t ut i ons usi ng a Ti me s  Hi gher Educati on Suppl em ent survey.  The 
i ndi vi dual   stati sti cal  signi f i cance of  r elati vel y  f ew  of  t hei r   i ndependent   vari ables,  t oget her  wi t h  a 
l arge,   hi ghl y signi f i cant,   const ant  t erm  l eads t hem  t o concl ude t hat   m anageri al  and perf orm ance 
i ndicators fail  t o off er any expl anati on for rew ard l evels. They i nst ead establi sh an idea of a
‘ goi ng r ate’  f or  vi ce-chancell ors.  M cN abb and W ass ( 1997)  use t he census of  academ ic salari es 
t o consi der the gender salary gap i n academ ia in 1975,  1985 and 1992. They conclude t hat  
wo me n  a r e less successful  i n achieving prom ot i ons fr om  t he l ecturer scale than t hei r  ma l e4
count erpart s,  and r eceive l ow er  r em unerati on.   Thei r   dat a,  how ever,   l acks vari ables on i ndi vi dual  
r esearch product i vi t y.  
I n cont r ast the U S l i t erature on academ ic pay,  wh e r e salary i s not  det ermi ned by a forma l  pay 
f r am ew ork,   i s extensive,   wi t h t he ma i n em phasi s l yi ng i n t he i nvest i gat i on of  t he gender  salary 
gap. W ork on t he w age t enure profi l e in academ ia has been undert aken by R ansom  (1993),  
Br ow n and W oodbury (1995) and H al l ock (1995) w ho provi de som e evi dence of a negat i ve 
r eturn t o t enure. Ransom  (1993) claims  t hat  the negat i ve return t o t enure is induced by t he 
m onopsony pow er of uni versit i es. Johnson and St aff ord (1974) a n d  Mc Do we l l  (1982) consi der
t he  eff ect  of  career  i nt err upt i on  on  salary  and  r eveal  evidence  of  negat i ve  eff ects t o  career  breaks 
wi t hi n som e subj ects. US r esearch, how ever,  also generall y suff ers fr om  t he l ack of det ail ed
product i vi t y vari ables.  On e   not able excepti on i s t he wor k  by Tuckm an,   Ga p i nski   and  H agem ann 
( 1977) w ho use cross secti onal  dat a fr om  1972-73 t o consi der rew ard t o t eaching abi l i t y,
r esearch product i vi t y,  publ i c servi ce and adm ini str ati ve ski l l .  They f i nd t hat  r esearch
product i vi t y i s the m ost  rew arded com ponent   of  academ ic’s abil i t y,   f ol l ow ed by adm ini str ati ve 
skil l .   Teaching  abil i t y  and  publ i c servi ce r eceive  sm all   and  negl i gi bl e r ew ard  r especti vel y.  
Consi derati on of reservat i on and deserved w age dat a has becom e m ore usual  in econom i cs in 
r ecent years. For  exam ple, wo r k usi ng dat a on reservat i on w ages exi sts in t he j ob-search
l i t erature. The mos t  we l l  know n of such studi es is by Lancast er and Chesher (1983) w ho use 
r espondent ’ s reservat i on w ages t o deduce t he st r uct ural param eters of the st andard opt i ma l  job
search m odel .   Thi s and  m any  ot her  studi es l ack a t est  of  t he  t r ue  i nforma t i onal   cont ent  of  dat a on 
r eservat i on w ages how ever.  O ne not able excepti on i s provi ded by Schm i dt  and W i nkel ma n n
( 1993),   w ho usi ng a Ge r ma n   survey on em ployed and unem pl oyed i ndi vi dual s and a stati onary 
j ob search m odel ,  com pare the st ated reservat i on w ages of t he unem pl oyed t o t he predicted
r eservat i on wa g e s   of  t he unem pl oyed,   based on t he accepted wa g e s   of  t he em ployed.   They  f i nd 
t hat   t he  t wo   t ypes  of  r eservat i on  wa g e s   are consi stent  wi t h each ot her,   i n ot her  wo r ds t hat   dat a on 
r eservat i on  wa g e s   are consi stent  wi t h  j ob  search t heory.   Wh i l e mo s t   previous  studi es use  dat a on 
t he r eservat i on wa g e s   of  t he unem pl oyed,   we   use r eservat i on wa g e s   of  em ployed.   Va n   den Be r g 
( 1992)  also uses such dat a,  t he ma j or  concl usi on f r om  hi s analysi s bei ng t hat   m ovi ng costs have 
a subst anti al  i m pact  on  t he  r eservat i on  wa g e .5
Wo r k on deserved wa g e s   can be f ound i n t he j ob sati sfacti on l i t erature,  wh e r e a group of  papers 
have  studi ed  com pari son  eff ects ( see for  exam ple,  Cappel l i   and  Sher er,   1988;   Cl ark  and  Os wa l d,  
1996;  Ha me r m esh 1977;  Ha mp t on and H eyw ood,  1999;  Sl oane and W i l l i am s 1996a).  He r e, 
wo r kers percepti ons of relati ve or ‘com pari son’ incom e ent ers thei r  ut i l i t y funct i on.  Indi vi dual  
j ob sat i sfacti on i s t herefore not   onl y aff ected by a wo r ker’ s ow n absolut e i ncom e l evel,   but   also 
by t hei r  i ncom e relati ve t o som e expect ed level or com pari son group.  Ha me r me s h  ( 1977) 
concl udes t hat  mu c h  o f  the di f f erenti al in (di s)sati sfacti on across w orkers is due t o i ndi vi dual s’
com pari son of thei r  present job w i t h t he benchm ark opport uni t i es open t o t hem .  Al t hough i n 
t hese studi es deserved wa g e   i s used as a r i ght - hand-side vari able and in our analysi s as the l eft -
hand-si de  vari able,  t hi s wo r k  em phasi zes t he  i m port ant  i nforma t i onal   cont ent  of  t hi s vari able.
3. D ata
The  dat a used i n t hi s paper  com e f r om  a uni que cross secti on study of  f i ve Scot t i sh Un i versit i es: 
Ab e r deen, D undee,  Gl asgow ,  He r i ot -W att  and St .  A ndrew s undert aken in 1995/ 6.  The dat a
i ncorporates detail ed informa t i on on t he personal   background,   wo r ki ng hi story,   product i vi t y and 
j ob sat i sfacti on of 878 academ ics, coll ected by m eans of post al quest i onnai r es.3  A cadem ic staff  
i ncl udes professors, senior lecturers and readers, lecturers and research assistants. The over -
wh e l mi ng  advant age of  t hi s dat aset  i s i t s uni queness  and  det ail .   I t   all ow s  us  t o  undert ake t he  f i r st 
det ail ed analysi s of  salary wi t hi n t he UK  academ ic profession.     I t s com parati ve di sadvant age i s 
i t ’ s cross secti onal   nat ure.    We   are onl y  able t o  analyze  a  snap- shot   of  t he academ ic profession at 
one poi nt  in t i me  wi t hout  the abi l i t y t o corr ect for selecti on i n and out  of the profession.  Thi s 
r estr i cti on i s an i m port ant  caveat  t o our  analysi s.  Ne v e r t hel ess t he analysi s of  t he cross secti onal  
pi cture i nt r oduces som e i nt eresti ng  proposi t i ons,   t o  be  chall enged  by  f ut ure r esearch.
Of  t he 878 academ ics fr om  w hom  i nforma t i on w as col l ected, we  s e l ect f ul l t i m e academ ics
( droppi ng 48 w ho wo r k part   t i me ) ,   t hose pai d on t he non-cli ni cal  scale ( droppi ng 51 pai d on t he
cli ni cal scale) and those academ ics w ho are under the age of 64 (droppi ng 3 i ndi vi dual s).  The 
part -ti m e academ ics are deleted fr om  our sam ple as w e do not  have good i nforma t i on on t hei r  
wo r ki ng hours, wh i ch m akes the com pari son of thei r  wa g e s  t o t he w ages of  f ul l t i me   academ ics 
3  The  average  response  rate  achieved  wa s   30% ,   reasonabl y  hi gh  for t hi s t ype  of  study.   Da t a  we r e   we i ght ed  for non-
r esponse  at  a  f acult y  l evel  by  sex all ow i ng  f or  non-r esponse  at  t he  l evel  of  r ank  by  sex.6
probl em ati c. The academ ics paid on t he cl i ni cal scale are dropped due t o t he di f f i cult y of 
i ncorporati ng  t hi s addi t i onal ,   hi gher  pai d,   scale i n  our  analysi s.  Fr om   our  ori gi nal   sam ple we   also 
l oose 106 observat i ons due t o i ncom pl ete data and anot her  35 observat i ons due t o i nt r actabil i t y 
of  spinal   salary poi nt .   We   are t herefore l eft   wi t h 635 observat i ons.
The dat aset cont ains i nforma t i on on an i ndi vi dual ’ s actual ,  reservat i on and deserved sal ary.  
Ac t ual   salary i s defi ned as a r espondent s’s r esponse t o t he quest i on ‘ Wh a t   i s your  annual   salary,  
t hat   i s before any deduct i ons f or  t ax,  nat i onal   i nsurance,  pensi on cont r i but i ons,   uni on dues and 
so on?’.  St aff  are asked to report  t hi s annual  salary t oget her wi t h t he paym ent  scale of t hi s 
r em unerati on.  Ac t ual  salary t herefore refers to pay received on t he uni versit y paym ent  scale 
onl y,   t hat   i s,  i t   ma k e s   unl i kel y any addi t i onal   salary att r acted f r om  consul t ancy etc.  Re s e r vat i on 
salary i s questi oned t hough ‘Wh a t  is the l ow est  salary t hat  you w oul d accept in order to m ove 
j obs?’.   Thi s quest i on  att em pts t o  capture t he  mi ni mu m  i ncenti ve  r equi r ed f or  academ ic m obi l i t y,  
wh e t her  i t   be m obi l i t y t o anot her  j ob wi t hi n t he academ ic profession,   or  out side.   Fi nal l y deserved 
salary i nforma t i on i s gathered in response t o t he quest i on ‘I n your vi ew , wh a t  salary do you
deserve  t o  get   per  annum ?’  and  i s quest i oned  i n  r elati on  t o  an i ndi vi dual s’  curr ent  annual   salary.
I n an att em pt  t o m easure t he non-pecuni ary advant ages of  an academ ic posi t i on,   t he dat aset  also 
cont ains det ail ed informa t i on on t he advant ages and disadvant ages of an academ ic job.
I ndi vi dual s are asked  t o  i dent i f y  t he  advant ages and di sadvant ages of  an academ ic career  r elati ve 
t o any career alt ernat i ves feasibl e w it h an i ndi vi dual ’ s present qual i f i cati ons and experi ence. 
Suggest ed advant ages incl uded t he fl exibi l i t y of wo r ki ng t i me t able, i nt eresti ng w ork,  t he
opport uni t y t o t r avel,  a relaxed w orki ng envi r onm ent ,  the opport uni t y t o t each, geographi cal 
m obi l i t y and j ob securi t y.   Suggest ed di sadvant ages i ncl uded l ess supervi sion/ gui dance,   a closed 
envi r onm ent  rem oved fr om  t he real wo r l d,  sm all er prom ot i onal  opport uni t y,  and m ore li mi t ed 
prom ot i on pat h.   Respondent s answ er  quest i ons on advant ages or  di sadvant age wi t h ‘ yes’  or  ‘ no’.
The def i ni t i ons of t he vari ables used in our analysi s are given i n Tabl e 1. Tabl e 2 presents 
s u mma r y st ati sti cs for our sam ple. The f i r st colum n i n t able 1 gi ves t h e  s u mma r y st ati sti cs for 
t he ful l  sam ple of 635 observat i ons. 4 W e see that  the m aj ori t y of Scot t i sh academ ics are m ale
and are UK  cit i zens.  A cadem ics hol d on average around 17 years of  experi ence,  nearl y 10 years 
4  De s c r i pt i ve  stati sti cs  f or  t he  com plete  dat aset  can  be  f ound  i n  Wa r d  ( 1999).7
of  wh i ch have been spent  wi t h t hei r   curr ent  uni versit y.   Ov e r   70%  of  academ ics hol d a PhD  and 
36%   are on  short -term  cont r acts.  A bout   31%   of  our  academ ics are r esearchers,  34%   are l ecturers, 
21%  are senior lecturers or readers and 14%  are professors. The s ci ence facult y i s largest  in 
t erms   of  i t s staff   num bers wi t hi n t he f i ve uni versit i es – nearl y 40%  of  academ ic consi dered staff  
wo r k  here and  D undee  and  Gl asgow  are t he  l argest   uni versit i es,  em ployi ng  26%   and  32%   of  our 
academ ics respecti vel y.  A bout  one out  of fi ve respondent s are evaluat ed by t hei r  student s as a 
skil l ed t eacher.
Tabl e 2  also presents average stati sti cs on  r esearch product i vi t y  vari ables.  The  average academ ic 
has publ i shed 20 refereed papers and one book.  As  r esearch tr adit i ons vary subst anti all y by
scienti f i c f i eld,   t able 3 presents t hese stati sti cs broken dow n by t he f acult y t hat   t he r espondent   i s 
wo r ki ng  i n.   The  t able show s  t hat   i n  t he  Ar t s and Soci al  Sci ences i t   i s r elati vel y com m on t o wr i t e 
books or chapters in books.  On  t he ot her hand,  the num ber of publ i shed papers is on average 
subst anti all y  hi gher  i n  Sci ence.  The  f ol l ow i ng  analysi s we   t ake t he  di f f erences bet w een scienti f i c 
f i elds i nt o account  by i ncl udi ng t he num ber of books,  chapters in books,  refereed papers, and 
grants,  di vi ded by t hei r   averages of  t he f i eld i n wh i ch t he r espondent   i s wo r ki ng,   as expl anatory 
vari ables.
Tabl e 4 presents t he average actual ,   r eservat i on and deserved salary stati sti cs f or  academ ics by 
r ank.  We   observe t hat   academ ics across r anks r eport   signi f i cantl y hi gher  deserved salari es t han 
t hey  actual l y  r eceive.   St aff   r eport   underpaym ent   wi t hi n  t hei r   curr ent  posi t i on  t o  t he  order  of  16%  
f or researchers, and around 20%  for lecturers, senior lecturers and professors. For  researchers 
and l ecturers w e observe t hat  the average reservat i on sal ary l i es betw een average actual  and
deserved.  St aff  in t hese grades w ould t herefore accept a salary l ow er that  that  they felt  they
deserved i n order to m ove j obs.  For  senior lecturers, readers and professors, how ever,  average 
r eservat i on  salary  i s hi gher  t han  deserved.   The  staff   i n  t hese  grades are t herefore l ess m obi l e and 
w oul d  need t o  be  r ew arded  above  t he  salary  t hey  bel i eve t hey  deserve i n order  t o m ove j obs.
Tabl e 5 gi ves a m at r i x representi ng t he num ber of indi vi dual s report i ng each of the vari ous 
com binat i ons  bet w een actual ,   r eservat i on  and  deserved  salary.   Poi nt s t o  not i ce f r om   t hi s t able are 
f i r stl y t hat   t he vast   ma j ori t y of  r espondent s r eport   a deserved salary t hat   i s greater  t han t hat   t hey 
actual l y r eceive.   The  vast   ma j ori t y also r eport   a r eservat i on salary greater  t han t hat   t hey actual l y 
r eceive.   Thi s pat t ern of  r eport s i s perhaps wh a t   we   mi ght   expect  and mi ght   be argued t o hol d t r ue 8
f or  a wi der  popul ati on of  wo r kers t han academ ics.  Ther e are t wo   i nt eresti ng,   and arguabl y mo r e 
unusual ,  groups t hat  em erge fr om  t hi s m atr i x how ever:  A cadem ics w it h l ow  report ed deserved 
salary,  that  is indi vi dual s w ho report  a deserved sal ary t hat  is eit her low er or equal  to t hei r  
curr ent salary,  and i ndi vi dual s w it h a l ow  reservat i on sal ary,  t hat  i s indi vi dual s w ho w oul d
accept a salary l ess or equal  to t hei r  curr ent salary i n order to m ove j obs.  Compa r i son of the 
ma j ori t y or ‘r eference group’ and these l ow  deserved and l ow  reservat i on groups i n t able 2
r eveal  mo r e about   t he  average characteri sti cs of  t hese  groups.   We   see t hat   i ndi vi dual s wi t h  a l ow  
r eservat i on salary are younger  t han our  r eference group – t hey are mo r e l i kel y t o be f em ale,  i n 
t he l ow er  r ungs  of  an academ ic career  and  on  a short -term  cont r act.   We   mi ght   characteri ze t hese 
wo r kers as the m ost  li kel y t o be m obi l e. Ou r  low  deserved sal ary i ndi vi dual s are in cont r ast 
ol der,   wi t h  a hi gher  experi ence and  t enure wi t h  curr ent  em ployer.     They  have had sli ght l y l onger 
peri ods  out   of  t he  l abour  ma r ket ,   and  are mo r e l i kel y  t o  be  wo r ki ng  i n  St . A ndrew s,  i n  t he  f acult y 
of  art s or  engi neeri ng  and  l ess l i kel y  t o  wo r k  as a l ecturer.  
Tabl e 6 report s the average response t o quest i ons concerni ng t he rel ati ve advant ages and
di sadvant ages of an academ ic career.  Int eresti ng w ork and t he fl exibi l i t y of an academ ic career 
are t he mo s t   f r equent l y cit ed advant ages of  an academ ic career  over  f easibl e career  alt ernat i ves.  
Pr om ot i on changes and a l ess str uct ured prom ot i on pat h are the m ost  f r equent l y ci t ed
di sadvant ages of  academ ia.  Ou r   l ow  r eservat i on academ ics are mo r e l i kel y t o consi der  academ ia 
as rem oved fr om  t he real wo r l d.  Ou r  low  deserved academ ics value i n part i cular the w orki ng 
envi r onm ent ,   i nt eresti ng wor k,   t he  f l exibi l i t y  and  opport uni t y  t o  t each wi t hi n  an academ ic career 
and  are l ess l i kel y  t o  r eport   prom ot i on  r elated di sadvant ages of  an academ ic career.
4.   The   academ i c  salary  scale
I n t he U . K.  academ ic sector,  all  academ ic and research staff  up t o professori al level are paid 
accordi ng t o a nat i onal l y agreed pay scale. Fi gure 1 presents the 1994/ 1995 sal ary scale.
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A cadem ics are pl aced ont o a part i cular  spinal   poi nt   wi t hi n a specif i c scale,  such as Lecturer  A,  
by t hei r  uni versit y and t hen ri se autom at i call y up t he r ungs or  poi nt s of  a scale,  one poi nt   each 
year,  unt i l  the m axi mu m f or that  scale is reached. A n academ ic w il l  seek prom ot i on fr om  one 
5 For  a part  of our sam ple the 1994/ 1995 scal e is relevant scale, wh i l e for anot her part  the 1995/ 1996 scal e is the 
r elevant  scale.  Compa r ed  t o  1994/ 1995  scale,  t he  salari es  of  t he  1995/ 1996  scale  we r e  i ncreased  by  2. 7  percent.   Thi s 
f actis t aken  i nt o  account   i n  our  analysi s.9
grade to t he next .  A ccelerated progression up t he poi nt s of a scale or through t he grades and 
addi t i onal  salary paym ent s in t he form o f  di screti onary aw ards are possibl e. Ther e exists
how ever  a mi ni mu m  poi nt   at  spinal   poi nt   4 f or  t hose staff   wi t h a PhD  and a mi ni mu m  poi nt   f or 
i ndi vi dual s aged 27 at  spinal   poi nt   6.   Thi s f r am ew ork all ow s us t o calculate a mi ni mu m  s pi nal
poi nt   f or  each academ ic,  on t he basi s of  age,  t enure and t i m e-out -of-labour - f orce.  For   i nst ance, 
an academ ic at  age 29 wi t h a t enure of  2 years has t o be at  l east  i n spinal   poi nt   8.  
On e  o f  t he ai ms  o f  our analysi s is to provi de som e vi sibi l i t y i nt o academ ic rew ard t hrough 
esti ma t es of  t he  r eturns  t o  i ndi vi dual   product i vi t y.   I n  t hi s secti on  we   start   wi t h  t he  analysi s of  t he 
det ermi nant s of  academ ic salary.   The  t r adit i onal   approach i s t o  appl y  l i near  r egression  t o  a wa g e  
equat i on.   Ho we v e r ,   t hi s approach i gnores t he dat a we   have on academ ic posi t i ons,   and i gnores 
t he fact that  salari es are not  cont i neousl y di str i but ed. Fur t hermo r e, a w age equat i on does not  
all ow  for pol i cy analysi s w it h respect to changes i n t he w ages w i t hi n sal ary scales, or wi t h
r espect  t o changes of  t he salary scale system  i t self .   I n order  t o t ake account   of  t hese probl em s, 
w e expl i cit l y m odel  the U K  academ ic system  of salary scales. St i l l  as a com pari son w e report  
and  di scuss wa g e   r egression  r esult s.
We   observe  annual   salary  and  paym ent   scale,  such as Lecturer  A  or  B,   f or  all   r espondent s i n  our 
sam ple. On l y 26 respondent s gave t hei r  exact spinal  poi nt  on t he scale. But  as several
r espondent s gave  an annual   salary  wh i ch f i t s exactl y  t o  a cert ain  poi nt   on  t he  salary  scale,  we   can 
i denti f y a spinal   poi nt   f or  an addi t i onal   165 r espondent s.    Si nce t here i s no f orma l   spinal   poi nt  
system  for professors, w e m odel  the posi t i on of a professor as being spi nal  poi nt  28.  Tabl e 7 
out l i nes t he di str i but i on of academ ics across pay scal es. To m odel  t he scales and salari es
simu l t aneously,  one has t o understand t hat  these are out com es of the sam e underl yi ng process. 
As   nei t her  of  t hese t wo   ki nds of  i nforma t i on i s perf ect,   i t   ma k e s   sense t o i ncorporate bot h pi eces 
of informa t i on i n a m odel .  To r ecapulate:  t he dat a on t he salary scales i n not   perf ect  as f or  t he 
l argest  part  of our sam ple w e onl y know  t he respondent s’ academ ic posi t i on;  the dat a on t he 
wa g e s   i s not   perf ect  as i t   clearl y  cont ains  m easurem ent  err or.
W e m odel  the spi nal  poi nt s and salary scal es as an ordered probi t ,  defi ni ng x i  as a vector of 
expl anatory vari ables, β as a param eter vector,  and εi
s an indi vi dual  di sturbance t erm.  The
mi ni mu m  spinal   poi nt   t hat   an academ ic can be  i n  i s r epresented by  t he  poi nt   m  and  t he  t hreshol d 
val ue  T
m ,   wh i ch i s det ermi ned by age,  t enure and t he t i me   bei ng out   of  t he j ob.10
( 1a) si
* =  x i ’ β  + εi
s
s i =  ji f   Tm ≤  Tj   <  s i
* ≤  Tj +1
=  mi f                                   s i
*  <  T
m
Ne x t   we   defi ne wi  as the nat ural logari t hm  of the sal ary of indi vi dual  i.  W e m odel  the sal ari es 
accordi ng t o t he salary scales of  f i gure 1 wi t h salary w
j   f or  t he spinal   poi nt s j   f r om  4 t o 27,   wi t h 
εi   a i ndi vi dual   di sturbance  t erm,   and  I ( s i   =  j )   an i ndi cator  f unct i on f or  bei ng on poi nt   j .
( 1b) w i =Σj =4, . . , 27    w
j   I (   s i   =  j   )     + εi
No t e t hat   due  t o  t he f act  t hat   our  i nforma t i on on spinal   poi nt s i s i mp e r f ect  - f or  mo s t   r espondent s 
w e onl y observe t he sal ary scale - the sal ari es contain addi t i onal  informa t i on t o est i ma t e the 
m odel .  In case w e w ould know  t he exact spinal  poi nt  for all  respondent s, equat i on ( 1b)  w oul d 
onl y  i dent i f y  t he  vari ance of  t he  err or  t erm  εi– wh i ch coul d be i nt erpreted as m easurem ent  err or.
Pr ofessors are not  pai d accordi ng t o t he sal ary scale, and t herefore w e m odel  thei r  salari es 
separately.  As  t here is a m ini mu m wa g e  f or professors, w e m odel  thei r  wa g e s  wi t h a censored 
r egression m odel ,  wi t h z i   as a vector  of  expl anatory vari ables, γ  as a param eter  vector,   and εi
*  as 
a  di sturbance  t erm.
( 1c) w i
* =  z i ’ γ  + εi
*
wi
p =  wi
* i f   w i
* >  wi
m
=  wi
m i f   w i
m =  wi
*
No t e that  the dat a on the sal ari es of the professors do not  add i nforma t i on t o t he m odel  of the 
spinal   poi nt s,  and coul d be l eft   out   of  t he m odel .   As   t he salari es of  t he professors are of  i nt erest 
by t hem sel ves how ever,  we  i ncl ude t hem  i n our m odel .   For  esti ma t i on w e assum e the
di sturbance t erms  ( εi
s, εi , εi
*)  to be i ndependent  of the expl anatory vari ables (x i, z i ) ,  and t o be 
i dent i call y and i ndependent l y t r i vari ate norma l l y di str i but ed.  Ou r   m odel   can be i nt erpreted as an 
extended  version  of  t he  sw it ching  r egression  or  t he  Tobi t   Type  5  m odel ,   see Ame mi ya  ( 1984),   i n 
wh i ch t he sw it ching part   of  t he m odel   i s r eplaced by an ordered probi t .11
I n t ot al,   we   f i nd t hat   69 r espondent s r eport   an annual   salary t hat   i s bel ow  t hei r   mi ni mu m  salary.  
Al t hough several  of  t hese cases mi ght   be due t o roundi ng err ors i n salary,   39 r espondent s r eport  
a wa g e   wh i ch i s i n l i ne wi t h a l ow er  spinal   poi nt .   Of   t hese 39 r espondent s,  16 r espondent s aged 
27 or  ol der  r eport   a salary t hat   i s consi stent  wi t h a poi nt   bel ow  t he mi ni ma l   spinal   poi nt   at  age 
27.  The questi on i s w hether thi s is due t o m easurem ent err or in our background vari ables, or 
wh e t her these i ndi vi dual s reall y accepted too l ow  a w age.  The pr obl em  also occurs am ong t he 
professors-  3 out  of 91 professors report  a salary t hat  is below  t he professional  mi ni mu m o f  
£31, 158 i n 1994.   So alt hough t here i s an off i cial  mi ni mu m  poi nt ,   i t   i s an open quest i on wh e t her 
i t   i s r eall y  eff ecti ve  i n  practi ce.  For   t he  purpose  of  our  analysi s,  we   esti ma t e t wo   m odel s,  a m odel  
wi t h,  and a m odel  wi t hout  restr i cti ons.   In t he m odel  wi t h restr i cti ons,  w e exclude t he 39
academ ics that  are paid on,  we  a r gue,  t oo l ow  a sal ary poi nt .  Re s ul t s for t hi s analysi s are 
presented i n t able 8.   On l y t he const ant  t erm  di f f ers i n signi f i cance bet w een t he t wo   m odel s. 
Tabl e 8 di splays the est i ma t i on r esult s.  We   do not   i ncl ude vari ables such as havi ng a short - t erm
cont r act and havi ng adm i ni str ati ve responsi bi l i t y am ong t he expl anatory vari ables, since w e 
j udge t hat   t hey are mo s t l y a r esult   of  t he r ank t hat   som eone has.   Thi s m eans t hat   t hey cannot  be
consi dered as being exogenous i n our m odel .   The  m odel   r eveals som e i nt eresti ng r esult s.  Fi r st,
we   f i nd  evidence  f or  som e deregul ati on of  establi shed pay and prom ot i on str uct ures;  we   f i nd t hat  
i n H eri ot -W att  Un i versit y and i n t he soci al sciences academ ics are put  on si gni f i cantl y hi gher 
spinal   poi nt s.  Thi s i s i n  l i ne  wi t h  M cN abb  and  W ass ( 1997),   alt hough  cont r ary  t o  t hei r   r esult s we  
f i nd no si gni f i cant di f f erence in rew ards t o ful l  t i m e academ ics across gender.  Second,
progression al ong spi nal  poi nt s is dr i ven al mo s t  solely by i ndi vi dual  product i vi t y vari ables. We  
r eveal a posi t i ve rew ard t o experi ence, num ber of books publ i shed, num ber of refereed papers 
publ i shed, num ber of grants aw arded and hi gh t eaching abi l i t y
6.  Thi r d,  we  f i nd evi dence of 
negat i ve effects to career breaks, possibl y due t o t he depreciati on eff ects of career breaks as 
subj ect  specif i c skil l s and  know l edge  becom e obsol ete. 
Ou r  r esult s are in cont r ast t o m ost  of t he earl i er l i t erature on t he gender wa g e - g a p  i n t he
academ ic labour ma r ket  since the gender - d u mmy  i s signi f i cant at all  convent i onal  signi f i cance 
l evels. The r eason for thi s cont r asti ng result  mi ght  be t he fact that  we  a r e able to corr ect for 
6  We   r ecognize t hat   t here mi ght   be som e causal  eff ect  t he ot her  wa y   around –  f r om   salary  t o  product i vi t y.   N one  of 
t he  papers  on  t hi s t opi c  me n t i ons  t hi s pot enti al  probl em .  A nd  also wi t h  our  dat a  at  hand  we   see  no  wa y   t o  corr ect  f or 
t hi s endogenei t y.  12
product i vi t y.  Excl udi ng t he product i vi t y vari ables (books,  chapters, papers, grants, havi ng  PhD,  
and t eaching ski l l s) fr om  our analysi s reveals a signi f i cant gender wa g e - gap at  a 10 percent 
signi f i cance level.  Mo s t  int eresti ng i n t hi s respect is the vari able out- of-labour- f orce. No t  onl y 
are  wo me n  mo r e li kel y t o have had a out -of-labour-force spell  (i n our sam ple 40 percent of 
wo me n   against   10 percent  of  me n ) ,   i f   t hey have had such a spell   t he durati on i s also l onger  ( i n 
our  sam ple 2. 5 years on average f or  wo me n   against   1. 5 years on average f or  me n ) .   I ncl udi ng an 
i nt eracti on t erm b e t w een gender and t he out-of-labour-f orce ti me  v a r i able reveals that  me n  a r e 
not   ‘ puni shed’  signi f i cantl y di f f erentl y f or  such spell s t o wo me n .   The  vari ables experi ence and 
t enure do not  incl ude t he out -of-labour- f orce t i me ,   so t he r esult s i ndi cate t hat   mo t hers,  and al so
f athers, w ho deci de t o t ake m aterni t y l eave are disadvant aged in t he academ ic labour ma r ket .  
Mc Do we l l   ( 1982)  argues  t hat   durabil i t y  of  know l edge  di f f ers signi f i cantl y  per  r esearch f i eld.   We  
t ested his hypot hesi s by i nt eracti ng t he out-of-labour-force vari able w it h t he facult y vari ables. 
We   f i nd  how ever  no  signi f i cant  di f f erences bet w een t he  f i elds  of  r esearch,  wh i ch mi ght   be  due  t o 
t he  f act  t hat   t he  num ber  of  observat i ons  i s sm all   f or  such a det ail ed analysi s.
Ou r  m odel  of professori al pay i s int eresti ng i n t hat   none of  t he expl anatory vari ables i ncl uded i n 
t he m odel  are signi f i cant.  Thi s suggests that  once the posi t i on of professor has been att ained 
f actors such as experi ence, publ i cati on record and t eaching ski l l s are no l onger im port ant to
r ew ard.   I nst ead one mi ght   argue t hat   f actors such as negot i ati on skil l ,   out side off ers and costs of 
m ovi ng m ay be i m port ant det ermi nant s of professori al pay,  wh i ch are not  captured w it hi n our 
m odel .   Thi s r esult   i s i n l i ne wi t h Ba i mb r i dge and Si m pson ( 1996),   w ho f i nd  very  f ew  signi f i cant 
vari ables in t hei r  m odel  of the fi nanci al rem unerati on of vi ce chancell ors and pri nci pal s at UK 
hi gher  i nst i t ut i ons,   and  i nst ead establi sh an i dea of  a ‘ goi ng  r ate’  f or  vi ce-chancell ors.
A ppendi x B  presents simu l ati ons wi t h r espect to product i vi t y and gender - r elated i ssues f or  t wo  
r eference academ ics.  Al t hough t he vari ables on r esearch product i vi t y i s hi ghl y signi f i cant  i n our 
m odel ,   t he size of  t hei r   i m pact  t urns out   t o be m odest .   Re ma r kl e i s t he i m pact  of  t eaching skil l s, 
f or  t he expected salary t he r ew ard t o good t eaching skil l s equal s t he r ew ard t o 12 t o 15 r efereed 
papers! A n expl anati on for thi s eff ect mi ght  be t hat  our teaching ski l l  vari able picks up ot her 
skil l s,  such as presentati on skil l s.  Al so r em arkebl e i s t he i m pact  of  out-of-labour-force t i me ;   i n 
expected salary  a one-year  spell   has t o be com pensated wi t h 4 t o 5 r efereed papers.  Al t hough t he 
gender -vari able it self  is not  signi f i cant,  our simu l ati ons show  t hat  the i m pact of gender-r elated
i ssues m ight  be consi derable. Changi ng our ma l e reference academ ics w it hout  an out - of-labour-13
f orce spell   i nt o a wo ma n   wi t h a one year  out-of-labour-t i me   spell   decreases, ceteris pari bus,   t he 
expected salary by 2. 8 t o 3. 8 percent.
A s a com pari son of our result s, we  a l so run a hum an capit al regression of salary against  
i ndi vi dual  characteri sti cs. The det ail ed result s of thi s are discussed in appendi x C.  The mai n
f i ndi ng i s t hat   t he overall   concl usi ons f r om  t hi s exercise are very mu c h   i n l i ne wi t h t he r esult s 
f r om   our  spinal   poi nt   and  salary   scale m odel .  
5.   R eservati on  and  deserved salary
I n t hi s secti on w e i nvest i gat e the underl yi ng det ermi nant s of academ ics’ r eservat i on and
deserved  salary.   I n doi ng so we   hoped t o det ermi ne t hose academ ics mo s t   at  r i sk f r om  bei ng l ost  
t o t he profession.   Al t hough m obi l i t y i n i t self  is not  a bad t hi ng for academ ics, one w oul d hope 
t hat   t he profession i s able t o r etain t he best   and mo s t   product i ve academ ics. We  defi ne W i   as an 
academ ic’s actual  annual  salary,  W i
r as his/her reservat i on sal ary,  and W i
das his/her deserved
salary. xi  i s a vector of expl anatory vari ables, β a param eter vector,  and εi an indi vi dual  
di sturbance t erm.  W e assum e actual  salary t o be exogenous,  and w e analyse t he devi ati on of 
r eservat i on  and  deserved  salary  f r om   actual   salary  usi ng  seem ingl y  unrelated r egression:
( 2a) 100  ( W i
r-   W i   )   /   W i     =  x i’ β
r  + ε
r
( 2b) 100  ( W i
d-   W i   ) /   W i     =  x i ’ β
d  + ε
d
We   r egress t he  percentage devi ati on  of  r eservat i on  and  deserved  salary  f r om   actual   salary  on  t he 
sam e set  of  expl anatory vari ables ut i l i sed i n secti on 4.   On e   coul d also argue t hat   non-pecuni ary
advant ages and disadvant ages of the j ob m ay be i m port ant in t he det ermi nat i on of reservat i on 
and deserved wa g e s .   Thi s i nforma t i on i s t herefore also i ncl uded as a seri es of  d u mmy   vari ables. 
Re s ul t s are presented i n  t able 9.   The  signi f i cance of  t he  corr elati on  coeff i cient  suggest s t hat   t here 
are unobserved vari ables t hat   det ermi nat e bot h academ ic’s r eservat i on and deserved salary.  
Consi deri ng r eservat i on wa g e s   f i r st,   we   see t hat  ceteris pari bus t he i m pact of  salary i s u- shaped
wi t h t he mi ni mu m  at  t he t op of  t he Lecturer  B  scale wi t h an annual   salary of  £26, 574.   Al t hough 14
hardl y si gni f i cant,  experi ence is n- shaped w it h t he m axi mu m a t  2. 3 years of experi ence. The
i nsi gni f i cant result s on t he product i vi t y vari ables in t able 9 provi de a neut r al answ er to our 
quest i on concerni ng wh e t her  academ ia can r etain i t s mo s t   product i ve staff .   I t   appears t hat   good 
academ ics are at least not  sett i ng l ow  reservat i on w ages for them sel ves i n order to l eave the 
profession.   On   t he ot her hand,  thi s is also tr ue of the l ess product i ve academ ics. A  surpri sing 
r esult  is the i m pact of the num ber of chapters, wh i ch has a signi f i cantl y negat i ve i m pact!  In
com binat i on wi t h t he i nsi gni f i cant  i m pact  of  t he num ber  of  chapters i n t he salary scale m odel ,   a 
r easonabl e expl anati on seem s t o be t hat   publ i shing chapters i n books i s under-valued i n Br i t i sh 
academ ia. Fi nal l y w e fi nd onl y w eakly si gni f i cant i m pacts of t he non-pecuni ary factors of 
geographi cal m obi l i t y and bei ng rem oved fr om  reali t y.  Ov er all ,  t herefore, pecuni ary
consi derati ons  dom i nat e t he  det ermi nat i on  of  academ ic’s r eservat i on  wa g e .  
Tur ni ng t o t he r esult s f or  deserved salary again r eveals a seniori t y eff ect  of  hi gher  wa g e s   on t he 
percentage deviati on of deserved sal ary fr om  actual  salary.  Thi s ti me  t he i m pact of wa g e s  i s 
i nsi gni f i cant but  the m i ni m um  poi nt  of the w age-squared funct i on l i es at £38. 571 –  wi t hi n t he 
professori al  grade.  The  eff ect  of  experi ence i s signi f i cant  and n-shaped wi t h t he ma x i mu m  at  an 
experi ence of 23 years. Thos e wi t h l ess experi ence are increasingl y di scont ented w it h t hei r  
appoi nt ed salary  poi nt .   Al t ernat i vel y,   t hi s r esult   ma y   r efl ect  a selecti on  eff ect.   Those  wi t h  a l ot   of 
experi ence w it hi n t he profession m ay be t hose w ho have achi eved thei r  best  ma t ch. St aff  wi t h
l ess experi ence m ay not yet  have done so,  and i t  is possibl e that  som e of these l ess sati sfi ed 
i ndi vi dual s l eave t he profession.   The  ‘ corr ect’   i nt erpretati on ma y   also dependent   on t he r eference 
group r eferr ed t o by t he r espondent   wi t hi n t he assessm ent of deserved sal ary.  For  young,  mo r e 
r ecentl y qual i f i ed academ ics t he r elevant  r eference group ma y   be mo r e l i kel y t o be ot her  young 
wo r kers,  i ncl udi ng t hose wo r ki ng i n t he pri vat e sector  w ho hol d a com parati ve wa g e   advant age. 
On  t he ot her hand,  ol der academ ics hol di ng m ai nl y speciali sed hum an capi t al ma y  c o mp a r e 
t hem sel ves  wi t h  t hei r   peers wi t hi n  t he  profession.  
Al so str i ki ng  wi t hi n  t hi s analysi s are t he  r esult s on  t he  skil l ed t eacher  vari able,  t he  size of  wh i ch 
i s consi derable at 6. 7 percent.  Thus,  alt hough w e fi nd evi dence of a signi f i cant r ew ard t o
t eaching ski l l  i n t he analysi s of actual  salary,  t hi s rew ard i s insuff i cient i n t he eyes of t he
academ ics them sel ves.  We  f i nd no evi dence of academ ics perceivi ng penal t i es to t i m e out  of 
l abour force. The eff ect of thi s vari able on deserved w age i s insi gni f i cant.  Fi nal l y,  the result s 
concerni ng t he (di s-) advant ages of academ ia ident i f y m ore about  the gri evances of our mo s t  15
di ssati sfi ed academ ics t han any evidence of  posi t i ve com pensati ng eff ects.  Di ssati sfacti on  wi t h 
prom ot i onal  prospect s increases deserved sal ary dem ands subst anti all y.  Thi s result  suggest s the 
i nt erdependence bet w een salary and posi t i on w i t hi n t he forma l  academ ic rew ard system .
Per cepti ons of  academ ia as bei ng r em oved f r om  t he r eal  wo r l d r educes  deserved  salary.
6. C oncl usi on.
Ou r  analysi s of actual ,  reservat i on and deserved sal ary w i t hi n t he U K  academ ic profession has 
uncovered a num ber of i nt eresti ng eff ects. Fi r stl y,  our r esult s out l i ne t he i m port ance of
publ i cati on,  grant receipt  and t eaching ski l l  in at t r acti ng fi nanci al rew ard w i t hi n t he curr ent 
paym ent  system . Wi t h t he i ncl usi on of t he sal ary fr am ew ork i nt o analysi s the relati onshi p
bet w een product i vi t y and i ndi vi dual  rew ard i s reinforced. Ou r  m odel  therefore provi des som e 
evidence t o ease concerns t hat  t he curr ent r ew ard system  does not  adequately recogni se
i ndi vi dual  product i vi t y.  Per haps surpri sing i n t hi s respect is the i m port ance of teaching ski l l s, 
wh i ch are revealed to have a si zable im pact on pay i n our simu l ati ons.  Secondl y,  we  f i nd  som e 
suggest i on of  a negat i ve r ew ard t o t i me   out   of  t he profession -  career  breaks carr y an associated 
penal t y, perhaps due t o depreciati on eff ects as subject specif i c skil l s and know l edge becom e 
obsol ete.  Si mu l ati ons show  t hat   t hi s eff ect  i s sizable;  t he salary l oss associated wi t h a one-year
out-of- l abour-f orce spell  w oul d requi r e com pensati on equi val ent to 4 t o 5 addi t i onal  refereed
papers. T hir d, none of the expl anatory vari ables incl uded i n our m odel  of professori al pay are 
signi f i cant.   Thi s suggest s that  once the posi t i on of professor has been att ained factors such as 
experi ence, publ i cati on record and t eaching ski l l s are no l onger im port ant to rew ard.  Inst ead 
f actors such as negot i ati on ski l l ,  out side off ers and costs of m ovi ng m ay be i m port ant
det ermi nant s of  professori al  pay.  
An a l ysi s of deserved and reservat i on sal ary suggest s that  cont r ol l i ng for i ndi vi dual
characteri sti cs, lecturers hol d t he l ow est  reservat i on sal ari es in relati on t o t hei r  curr ent salary
l evel.   The  Pr ofession  i s t herefore mo s t   at  r i sk f r om   l oosi ng  i t s youngest   staff   –  presum ably  t hose 
w ho  wi l l   also f i nd  i t   easiest  t o  att r act  j ob  off ers f r om   out side  academ ia.    We   f i nd  t hat   hi ghl y  pai d 
professors are mo s t   at  ease wi t h t hei r   salary posi t i on.   I n cont r ast,   l ow er  r ung academ ics are t he
l east cont ent.  An a l ysi s also reveals som e evidence of di ssati sfacti on w i t h actual  pay for those 
wi t h  hi gh  t eaching  abil i t y.16
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Fi gure 1
SALARY  SCALES  1994/ 1995
Joi nt   Negot i at i ng  Co mmi t t ee  f or   Non- Cl i ni cal   Academ i c  and  Academ i c  Rel at ed  St af f
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Not es: *  Age  27  poi nt
#  Mi ni mu m  appoi nt m ent   l evel   f or   st af f   wi t h  PhD
** Poi nt   19  was   del et ed  wi t h  ef f ect   f r om   1. 4. 91
Gr ade  I V  Mi ni mu m
£31, 158
Pr of essori al   Mi ni mu m
  £31, 158












































































































Tabl e  1:  l i st  of  vari abl es
Name Def i ni t i on
I ndi vi dual   char .
G ender , =  1  i f   ma l e,   =  0  i f   f em al e
Ci t i zen , =  1  i f   UK  ci t i zen,   =  0  ot her wi se
Job  char .
Exper i ence Lenght   t ot al   l abour   ma r ket   exper i ence,   me a s u r ed  i n  year s
1
Job  t enur e Lenght   of   t i me   wi t h  curr ent   em pl oyer ,   m easur ed  i n  year s
1
Ti m e-out Lenght   of   t i me   out   of   l abour   f or ce,   m easur ed  i n  year s
Shor t -ter m, =  1  i f   cont r act   f or   3  or   l ess  year s,   =  0  ot her wi se
Job  posi t i on
Resear cher , =  1  i f   r esear cher ,   =  0  ot her wi se
Lect ur er , =  1  i f   l ect ur er   A  or   l ect ur er   B,   =  0  ot her wi se
Sen. Lec. / Reader , =  1  i f   seni or   l ect ur er   or   r eader ,   =  0  ot her wi se
Pr of essor , =  1  i f   pr of essor,   =  0  ot her wi se
Uni versi t y Du mmi es  f or  t he  f i ve  uni versi t i es  f r om   whi ch  t he  dat a  ar e  sam pl ed  f r om
Facul t y Du mmi es  f or   t he  f i ve  f acul t i es  f r om   whi ch  t he  dat a  ar e  sam pl ed  f r om
Publ i cat i ons
Books Tot al   num ber   of   books  publ i shed
Chapt er sT o t al   num ber   of   chapt er s  publ i shed  i n  books
Paper sT o t al   num ber   of   r ef er eed  publ i cat i ons  publ i shed
Ot her
Gr ant sT o t al   num ber   of   gr ant s  r ecei ved
Hav i ng  PhD , =  1  i f   hol ds  a  PhD,   =  0  ot her wi se
Teach. ski l l, =  1  i f   ski l l ed  t eacher   ( based  on  st udent ’ s  eval uat i ons) ,   =  0  ot her wi se
Advant ages Advant ages  of   pr esent   career   over   f easi bl e  al t er nat i ves  accordi ng  t o  r espondent ’ s  opi ni on
Envi r onm ent , =  1  i f   r el axed  wor ki ng  envi r onm ent   i s  an  advant age,   =  0  ot her wi se
I nt er est i ng  wor k, =  1  i f   i nt er est i ng  wor k  i s  an  advant age,   =  0  ot her wi se
Responsi bi l i t y, =  1  i f   oppor t uni t y  t o  hol d  r esponsi bi l i t y  i s  an  advant age,   =  0  ot her wi se
Job  Secur i t y, =  1  i f   j ob  saf et y  i s  an  advant age,   =  0  ot her wi se
Fl exi bi l i t y, =  1  i f   f l exi bl e  wor ki ng  t i me t abl e  i s  an  advant age,   =  0  ot her wi se
Tr avel i ng , =  1  i f   oppor t uni t y  t o  t r avel   i s  an  advant age,   =  0  ot her wi se
M obi l i t y, =  1  i f   geogr aphi cal   m obi l i t y  i s  an  advant age,   =  0  ot her wi se
Teachi ng , =  1  i f   oppor t uni t y  t o  t each  i s  an  advant age,   =  0  ot her wi se
Di sadvant ages Di sadvant ages  of   pr esent   career   over   f easi bl e  al t er nat i ves  accordi ng  t o  r espondent ’ s opi ni on
Super vi si on , =  1  i f   l ess  super vi si on  i s  a  di sadvant age,   =  0  ot her wi se
Pr om .  Chances , =  1  i f   sm al l er   oppor t uni t y  f or   pr om ot i on  i s  a  di sadvant age,   =  0  ot her wi se
Pr om .  Pat h, =  1  i f   mo r e  l i mi t ed  pr om ot i on  pat h  i s  a  di sadvant age,   =  0  ot her wi se
Real i t y, =  1  i f   r em oval   f r om   r eal   wor l d  i s  a  di sadvant age,   =  0  ot her wi se
1)exper i ence  and  t enur e  do  not   i ncl ude  t he  t i me   bei ng  out   of   t he  l abour   f or ce.20
Tabl e  2:  sam ple  stati sti cs
    Ful l   sam pl e    Ref er ence  gr oup     Low  r es.   wage     Low  des.   W age
    w
r  >  w,   w
d  >  w    w
r  <=  w    w
d  <=  w
    ( 635  obs. )    ( 282  obs. )      ( 175  obs. )    ( 97  obs. )
I ndi vi dual   char .
Age - 29 0. 213 0. 202 0. 303 0. 216
Age  30-39 0. 312 0. 319 0. 367 0. 247
Age  40-49 0. 265 0. 270 0. 240 0. 289
Age  50- 0. 211 0. 209 0. 091 0. 247
G ender 0. 691 0. 734 0. 611 0. 701
Ci t i zen 0. 882 0. 862 0. 903 0. 928
Job  char .
Exper i ence 16. 731 ( 10. 854) 16. 668 (10. 379) 13. 243 ( 9. 978) 17. 856 ( 11. 150)
Job  t enur e9 . 700 ( 9. 997) 9. 790 (10. 052) 6. 864 ( 7. 696) 10. 077 ( 10. 473)
Ti me- out 0 . 422 ( 1. 646) 0. 341 (1. 302) 0. 471 ( 1. 457) 0. 672 ( 2. 869)
Shor t -ter m0 . 361 0. 323 0. 571 0. 351
Job  posi t i on
Resear cher 0. 312 0. 284 0. 474 0. 351
Lect ur er 0. 340 0. 355 0. 326 0. 206
Sen. Lec. / Reader 0. 205 0. 202 0. 114 0. 258
Pr of essor 0. 143 0. 160 0. 086 0. 186
Uni versi t y
Aber deen 0. 162 0. 167 0. 120 0. 103
Dundee 0. 260 0. 241 0. 263 0. 299
Her i ot -W att s0 . 068 0. 078 0. 069 0. 041
St . Andr ews 0. 192 0. 184 0. 223 0. 237
Gl asgow 0. 318 0. 330 0. 326 0. 320
Facul t y
Ar t s0 . 170 0. 131 0. 166 0. 237
Engi neer 0. 139 0. 145 0. 086 0. 175
M edi ci ne 0. 143 0. 160 0. 154 0. 144
Sci ence 0. 387 0. 404 0. 457 0. 320
Soc. sci ence 0. 161 0. 160 0. 137 0. 124
Publ i cat i ons
Books 1. 074 ( 2. 418) 1. 043 (2. 559) 0. 783 ( 2. 122) 1. 051 ( 1. 856)
Chapt er s2 . 805 ( 6. 515) 2. 691 (4. 982) 1. 800 ( 3. 883) 2. 278 ( 4. 361)
Paper s 20. 109 ( 28. 292) 20. 411 (25. 966) 14. 720 ( 28. 317) 20. 422 ( 30. 367)
Ot her
Gr ant s4 . 951 ( 8. 151) 5. 557 (8. 069) 3. 589 ( 7. 309) 4. 463 ( 8. 713)
Hav i ng  PhD 0. 728 0. 748 0. 709 0. 701
Teach. ski l l0 . 198 0. 209 0. 149 0. 175
Not e:   t he  f i r st   col um n  pr esent s  t he  st at i st i cs  of   t he  f ul l   sam pl e,   t he  second  col um n  r epr esent s  t he  st at i st i cs  of   t he  r ef er ence  gr oup 
( bot h  r eser vat i on  sal ar y  w
r  and  deser ved  sal ar y  w
r  ar e  l ar ger   t han  t he  act ual   sal ar y  w) .   Bet ween  par ent heses  t he  st andar d 
devi at i ons.21
Tabl e 3:  research product i vi t y  stati sti cs
num ber
Facul t yo f   obs. age books       chapt er s paper s  gr ant s
Ar t s 107 45. 73 (9. 84) 2. 28 ( 3. 39) 3. 89 ( 5. 22) 13. 03 ( 15. 89) 2. 54 (4. 49)
Engi neer 88 39. 00 ( 10. 49) 0. 28 ( 0. 80) 2. 05 ( 10. 90) 16. 68 ( 24. 26) 4. 48 (6. 57)
M edi ci ne 91 36. 85 (9. 13) 0. 46 ( 1. 11) 2. 22 ( 4. 51) 19. 68 ( 26. 27) 6. 12 (10. 86)
Sci ence 246 39. 42 ( 10. 50) 0. 60 ( 1. 38) 2. 13 ( 5. 06) 26. 50 ( 34. 58) 6. 13 (9. 39)
Soc. Sci ence 103 40. 80 ( 10. 35) 2. 17 ( 3. 74) 4. 49 ( 6. 74) 15. 50 ( 23. 40) 4. 02 (5. 28)
Not e:   St andar d  devi at i ons  bet ween  par ent heses.
Tabl e  4:  salary  stati sti cs
num ber   of                         Act ual                         Res er vat i on                         Des er ved
obser vat i ons                         sal ar y                        sal ar y                        sal ar y
Resear cher 162 17. 24 (2 .66) 18. 04 ( 5. 02) 19. 97 (4 .57)
Lect ur er 154 22. 20 (3 .55) 25. 36 ( 7. 33) 26. 85 (5 .53)
Sen. Lec/ Reader 84 29. 98 (1 .83) 37. 02 ( 11. 43) 35. 63 ( 5. 11)
Pr of essor 66 37. 30 (4 .01) 47. 56 ( 18. 96) 44. 61 (8 .47)
Not e:  onl y obser vat i ons wi t h act ual ,  reser vat i on,  and deser ved sal ar y obser ved ar e i ncl uded.  Sal ar y i n 1, 000 BP per  year ,  and 
com par abl e  t o  t he  1994/ 1995  sal ar y  scal e.   St andar d  devi at i ons  bet ween  par ent heses.
Tabl e  5:  observati ons  on  salary
w
d  mi ssi ng w
d  <  ww
d  =  ww
d  >  wT o t al
w
r   mi ssi ng 34 8 20 53 115
w
r   <  w 11 18 17 76 122
w
r   =  w 6 3 5 39 53
w
r   >  w 37 5 21 282 345
Tot al 88 34 63 450 635
Tabl e  6:  ( di s-) advantages  stati sti cs
Ful l   sam pl eR e f er ence  gr oup Low    r es.   wage Low   des.   wage
w
r>w







( 635  obs. )( 282  obs. )( 175  obs. )( 97  obs. )
Advant ages
Envi r onm ent 0. 516 0. 475 0. 549 0. 598
I nt er est i ng  wor k0 . 885 0. 922 0. 817 0. 928
Responsi bi l i t y0 . 403 0. 422 0. 326 0. 381
Job  Secur i t y0 . 313 0. 305 0. 269 0. 278
Fl exi bi l i t y0 . 789 0. 805 0. 783 0. 814
Tr avel l i ng 0. 529 0. 589 0. 497 0. 526
M obi l i t y0 . 100 0. 106 0. 126 0. 113
Teachi ng 0. 498 0. 493 0. 451 0. 536
Di sadv.
Super vi si on 0. 081 0. 064 0. 131 0. 103
Pr om .  Chances 0. 457 0. 532 0. 463 0. 299
Pr om .  Pat h0 . 469 0. 514 0. 497 0. 278
Real i t y0 . 170 0. 128 0. 280 0. 237
Not e:   t he  f i r st   col um n  pr esent s  t he  st at i st i cs  of   t he  f ul l   sam pl e,   t he  second  col um n  r epr esent s  t he  st at i st i cs  of   t he  r ef er ence  gr oup 
( bot h  r eser vat i on  sal ar y  w
r  and  deser ved  sal ar y  w
d  ar e  l ar ger   t han  t he  act ual   sal ar y  w) .   Bet ween  par ent heses  t he  st andar d 
devi at i ons.22
Tabl e  7:  observati ons  on  spinal   poi nt s and  salary  scales
Spi nal   poi nt Academ i c  st af f Resear ch  st af f
4( 3  obs. )G r ade  I . B
5( 12  obs. )P o i nt s 4- 6
6( 18  obs. )( 26  obs. )
7( 9  obs. ) Lect ur er   A
8( 9  obs. )P o i nt s 5-11 G r ade  I . A
9( 14  obs. )( 58  obs. )P o i nt s 4  –13
10 (7  obs. )( 77  obs. )
11 (11  obs. )
12 (9  obs. )
13 (10  obs. )
14 (2  obs. )
15 (7  obs. )L e c t ur er   BG r ade  I I
16 (3  obs. )P o i nt s  12- 22 Poi nt s  11- 22
17 (6  obs. )( 88  obs. )( 13  obs. )
18 (18  obs. )
20 (11  obs. )
21 (7  obs. )
22 (3  obs. )
23 (2  obs. ) Sen. Lec. / Reader Gr ade  I I I
24 (15  obs. )P o i nt s  20- 27 Poi nt s  17- 27
25 (8  obs. )( 89  obs. )( 2  obs. )
26 (4  obs. )
27 (3  obs. )
Pr of essor
( 91  obs. )23
Tabl e 8:  Es t i ma t i on  result s on  spinal   poi nt   and  salary  scale
M odel   wi t hout   r est r i ct i ons M odel   wi t h  r est r i ct i ons
            Spi nal   Poi nt                             Ln( Sal ar y  Prof . )                            Spi nal   Poi nt                         Ln( Sal ar y  Pr of . )
Par . s. e. par s. e. par . s. e. par . s. e
I ndi vi dual   char .
I nt er cept 0. 4076 ( 0. 3799) 10. 597 ***(0. 1312) -0. 4523 ( 0. 5174) 10. 5917 ***(0. 1085)
Sex 0. 1109 ( 0. 1385) 0. 1362 ( 0. 1794)
Ci t i zen 0. 1266 ( 0. 1763) 0. 2781 ( 0. 2313)
Job  Char .
Exper i ence 0. 1929 ***(0. 0271) 0. 2405 ***(0. 0345)
Exper i ence²/ 10 -0. 0274 ***(0. 0068) -0. 0358 ***(0. 0081)
Tenur e0 . 0201 ( 0. 0268) 0. 0036 ( 0. 0058) -0. 0288 ( 0. 0323) 0. 0038 ( 0. 0056)
Tenur e²/ 10 -0. 0054 ( 0. 0086) - 0. 0018 ( 0. 0017) 0. 0075 ( 0. 0100) -0. 0018 ( 0. 0017)
Ti me-out -0. 0952 ***(0. 0351) -0. 1201 **( 0. 0485)
Uni versi t y
Aber deen 0. 1704 ( 0. 1768) - 0. 0188 ( 0. 0446) 0. 1981 ( 0. 2030) -0. 0194 ( 0. 0437)
Dundee 0. 0445 ( 0. 1526) - 0. 0044 ( 0. 0575) 0. 0899 ( 0. 1962) -0. 0054 ( 0. 0565)
Her i ot -W att s0 . 5524 ***(0. 2579) - 0. 0614 ( 0. 0587) 0. 6011 **( 0. 2973) -0.0607 ( 0. 0574)
St . Andr ews -0. 0655 ( 0. 1709) 0. 0612 ( 0. 0460) -0. 0395 ( 0. 2109) 0. 0621 ( 0. 0451)
Facul t y
Ar t s0 . 1021 ( 0. 1749) - 0. 0102 ( 0. 0487) 0. 1064 ( 0. 2052) -0. 0112 ( 0. 0478)
Engi neer -0. 2895 ( 0. 1905) 0. 0470 ( 0. 0578) -0. 3974 ( 0. 2423) 0. 0502 ( 0. 0567)
M edi ci ne -0. 0207 ( 0. 1904) 0. 0768 ( 0. 0613) -0. 0758 ( 0. 2362) 0. 0076 ( 0. 0602)
Soc. Sci ence 0. 3611 **( 0. 1859) - 0. 0143 ( 0. 0505) 0. 3070 ( 0. 2224) -0. 0131 ( 0. 0485)
Publ i cat i ons
Books  /   aver age  by  f ac. 0. 1165 ***(0. 0369) - 0. 0060 ( 0. 0059) 0. 1223 ***(0. 0397) -0.0056 ( 0. 0059)
Chapt .   /   aver age  by  f ac. -0. 0216 ( 0. 0254) - 0. 0048 ( 0. 0055) -0. 0240 ( 0. 0268) -0. 0050 ( 0. 0054)
Paper s  /   aver age  by  f ac. 0. 3614 ***(0. 0747) 0. 0009 ( 0. 0114) 0. 3933 ***(0. 0815) 0. 0008 ( 0. 0108)
Ot her
Gr ant s  /   aver age  by  f ac. 0. 1333 ***(0. 0462) 0. 0064 ( 0. 0101) 0. 1616 ***(0. 0502) 0. 0060 ( 0. 0100)
Hav i ng  PhD 0. 2323 ( 0. 1423) - 0. 0434 ( 0. 0441) -0. 0279 ( 0. 1788) -0. 0390 ( 0. 0414)
Teach. ski l l0 . 3229 **( 0. 1527) 0. 0384 ( 0. 0359) 0. 3208 *( 0. 1717) 0. 0374 ( 0. 0351)
Di st r .   par am et er s
St andar d  dev. 0. 0728 ( 0. 0047) 0. 0928 ( 0. 0122) 0. 0721 ( 0. 0047) 0. 0908 ( 0. 0116)
Cor r el at i on -0. 5043 ( 0. 0717) - 0. 0213 ( 0. 5083) -0. 4487 ( 0. 0896) -0. 2134 ( 0. 4729)24
Tabl e 9:  Es t i ma t i on  result s on  reservati on  and  desi red salary
                        Res er vat i on  sal ar y                    Des er ved  sal ar y
      100( W
r-W )/ W            100( W
d-W )/ W
par .s . e. par .s . e.
I ndi vi dual   char .
I nt er cept 46. 0216 ***(19. 8374) 28. 7897 ***( 11. 0619)
G ender - 0. 7159 ( 3. 4582) - 0. 5066 ( 1. 9284)
Ci t i zen -2. 6702 ( 4. 2539) - 0. 1478 ( 2. 3721)
Job  char .
( W/ 10, 000) -37. 2322 ***(15. 6570) -13. 5078 ( 8. 7308)
( W/ 10, 000) ²7 . 0052 ***(2. 5820) 1. 7516 ( 1. 4398)
Exper i ence 1. 1957 *( 0. 6868) 0. 7518 **( 0. 3830)
Exper i ence² / 10 - 0. 2621 ( 0. 1767) - 0. 1577 ( 0. 0985)
Tenur e0 . 3020 ( 0. 6604) 0. 0478 ( 0. 3683)
Tenur e² / 10 0. 1234 ( 0. 2139) 0. 0452 ( 0. 1193)
Ti me-out - 1. 0188 ( 1. 0803) - 0. 7616 ( 0. 6024)
Uni versi t y
Aber deen 1. 5043 ( 4. 4223) 2. 1708 ( 2. 4660)
Dundee 1. 0357 ( 3. 7018) - 2. 0651 ( 2. 0642)
Her i ot -W att s- 0. 0763 ( 5. 9366) 0. 8174 ( 3. 3104)
St . Andr ews 4. 0506 ( 4. 0109) - 0. 2100 ( 2. 2366)
Facul t y
Ar t s- 6. 7891 ( 4. 3780) - 3. 3358 ( 2. 4413)
Engi neer 5. 3442 ( 4. 6596) - 1. 2326 ( 2. 5983)
M edi ci ne - 0. 5462 ( 4. 3939) - 1. 0640 ( 2. 4502)
Soc. Sci ence - 0. 8213 ( 4. 4326) - 1. 9342 ( 2. 4717)
Publ i cat i ons
Books  /   aver age  by  f ac. 0. 6081 ( 0. 7685) 0. 0474 ( 0. 4286)
Chapt .   /   aver age  by  f ac. - 2. 0800 **( 0. 9370) - 0. 9156 *( 0. 5225)
Paper s  /   aver age  by  f ac. 2. 2234 ( 1. 4724) 0. 9480 ( 0. 8210)
Ot her
Gr ant   /   aver age  by  f ac. - 1. 1425 ( 1. 2726) 0. 3022 ( 0. 7097)
Hav i ng  PhD - 1. 2046 ( 3. 4186) 3. 4236 *( 1. 9063)
Teach. ski l l1 . 9112 ( 3. 7400) 6. 6908 ***(2. 0855)
Advant ages
Envi r onm ent 0. 2705 ( 2. 9771) - 1. 3194 ( 1. 6601)
I nt er est i ng  wo r k 5 . 9962 ( 4. 7202) 0. 9330 ( 2. 6321)
Responsi bi l i t y2 . 3727 ( 3. 0073) 2. 4883 ( 1. 6769)
Job  Secur i t y0 . 0771 ( 3. 3258) 0. 7457 ( 1. 8545)
Fl exi bi l i t y- 5. 2465 ( 3. 7554) - 1. 4879 ( 2. 0941)
Tr avel i ng 4. 0951 ( 2. 9156) 0. 2794 ( 1. 6258)
M obi l i t y- 8. 1788 *( 4. 4352) - 0. 1649 ( 2. 4732)
Teachi ng 1. 0688 ( 3. 0293) - 2. 2623 ( 1. 6892)
Di sadvant ages
Super vi si on - 7. 7305 ( 4. 9172) - 3. 1455 ( 2. 7420)
Pr om .  Chances 3. 1738 ( 3. 1769) 4. 0241 **( 1. 7715)
Pr om .  Pat h- 2. 9296 ( 3. 0845) 3. 4224 **( 1. 7200)
Real i t y- 6. 5586 *( 3. 6697) - 4. 6591 **( 2. 0463)
Cor r el at i on  coef f .0 . 2664***25
Appendi x  A:   Es t i ma t i on  of  spinal   poi nt   and  salary  scale mo d e l
W e m odel  the spi nal  poi nt s and salary scales as an ordered probi t .  De f i ne xi  as a vector of 
expl anatory vari ables, β as a param eter vector,  and εi
s an indi vi dual  di sturbance t erm.  The
mi ni mu m  spinal   poi nt   t hat   an academ ic can be i n i s r epresented by t he poi nt   m  and t he t r eshol d 
val ue  T
m ,   wh i ch i s det ermi ned by age,  t enure and t he t i me   bei ng out   of  t he j ob.
( 1a) si
* =  x i ’ β  + εi
s
s i =  ji f   Tm ≤  Tj   <  s i
* ≤  Tj +1
=  mi f                                   s i
*  <  Tm
Ne x t  defi ne w i  as the nat ural l ogari t hm  of t he sal ary of i ndi vi dual  i .  W e m odel  t he sal ari es 
accordi ng t o t he sal ary scales of fi gure 1 w it h sal ary w
j   f or  t he scales j   f r om  4 t o 27,   wi t h εi   a 
i ndi vi dual   di sturbance  t erm,   and  I ( s i   =  j )   an i ndi cator  f unct i on f or  bei ng i n scale j .
( 1b) w i =Σj =4, . . , 27    w
j   I (   s i   =  j   )     + εi
No t e t hat   due t o t he f act  t hat   our  i nforma t i on on spinal   poi nt s i s i mp e r f ect  - f or  mo s t   r espondent s 
w e onl y observe t he sal ary scale-  the sal ari es contain addi t i onal  informa t i on t o est i ma t e the 
m odel .  In case w e w ould know  t he exact spinal  poi nt  for all  respondent s, equat i on (1b) w oul d 
onl y  i dent i f y  t he  vari ance of  t he  err or  t erm  εi– wh i ch coul d be i nt erpreted as m easurem ent  err or.
Pr ofessors are not  pai d accordi ng t o t he sal ary scale, and t herefore w e m odel  thei r  salari es 
separately.  As  t here is a m ini mu m wa g e  f or professors, w e m odel  thei r  wa g e s  wi t h a censored 
r egression m odel ,  wi t h z i   as a vector  of  expl anatory vari ables, γ  as a param eter  vect or,   and εi
*  as 
a  di sturbance  t erm.
( 1c) w i
* =  z i ’ γ  + εi
*
wi
p =  wi
* i f   w i
* >  wi
m
=  wi
m i f   w i
m =  wi
*26
No t e t hat   t he dat a on t he salari es of  t he professors do actual l y not   add i nforma t i on t o t he m odel  
of  t he spinal   poi nt s,  and coul d be l eft   out   of  t he  m odel .   As   t he  salary  equat i on  of  t he  professors i s 
i nt eresti ng i n i t self ,  we  i ncl ude i t  in our m odel .   For esti ma t i on w e assum e t hat  the di sturbance 
t erms  ( εi
s, εi , εi
*)  to be i ndependent  of the expl anatory vari ables (x i, z i )  and t o be i dent i call y  and 
i ndependent l y t r i vari ate norma l l y di str i but ed. Ou r  m odel  can be int erpreted as an extended
version  of  t he  sw it ching  r egression  or  t he  Tobi t   Type  5  m odel ,   see Ami mi ya  ( 1984),   i n  wh i ch t he 
sw it ching part  of the m odel  is replaced by an ordered probi t .  As  f r om  t he dat a it  is not  clear 
wh e t her  t he r estr i cti ons on t he scales and t he professional   salari es hol d i n practi ce,  we   decide t o 
esti ma t e one m odel  wi t hout  restr i cti ons,  and one m odel  wi t h restr i cti ons.  We  f i r st di scuss the 
esti ma t i on of  t he m odel   wi t hout   t he  r estr i cti ons.
Mo d e l   wi t hout   r estr i cti ons
The  l i kel i hood  cont r i but i on  f or  an academ ic i   i n  scale j   and  wa g e   wi   i s:
P(   s i =j ,   wi)= P (   s i
*=  T
j +1,   wi)–  P(   s i
*=  T
j ,   wi)
=[   P(   s i
*=  T j +1|   wi)–  P(   s i
*=  Tj|   wi)   ]   P( wi)
wi t h f or  non-professors ( j =27):
P(   s i
*=  T
j|   wi)= F (   (T
j– x i ’ β – (?/s)(w i– w
j )   )   /   v(1–?² )   )
P( w i ) = f( (w i– w
j )/  s)
and  f or  professors ( j =28):
P(   s i
*=  T
j|   wi)= F (   (T
j– x i ’ β – (?
*/ s
*) ( wi– z i ’ γ)   )   /   v(1–?
*² )   )
P( w i ) = f( (w i– z i’ γ) / s*)
No t e t hat   t he standard devi ati on of  εi
s  i s set  t o one.   No t e also t hat   f or  t hi s m odel   t he corr elati on 
bet w een t he err or-t erms   of  t he wa g e s   f or  t he non-professors a nd professors is not  ident i f i ed. For  
a com parable r esult ,   see t he  Tobi t   Type  5  m odel   of  Ame mi ya  ( 1984).27
M odel   wi t h  r estr i cti ons
The  l i kel i hood  cont r i but i on  f or  a non-professor  i   i n scale j   and wa g e   wi   i s:
P(   s i =j ,   wi|   s i =m   )= P (   s i =j ,   wi)   /   P(   s i=m  )( j =m )
As  t he nom i nat or i s the sam e as f or t he m odel  wi t hout  r estr i cti ons,  t he deri vat i on of t he
l i kel i hood cont r i but i on i s furt hermo r e str aight f orwa r d.  For  esti ma t i on w e del eted the 39
i ndi vi dual s wi t h  j <m   f r om   t he  dat a.  The  l i kel i hood  cont r i but i on  f or  a professor  i   wi t h  wa g e   wi   i s:
P(   s i =28,   wi|   s i=m ,   wi=w i
m)= P (   s i =28,   wi)   /   P(   s i =m ,   wi=wi
m  )
Ag a i n t he nom i nat or is the sam e as for the m odel  wi t hout  restr i cti ons.  For  3 professors w it h a 
r eport ed salary bel ow  t he professional  mi ni mu m,  we  s e t  t he sal ary equal  to t hi s professional  
mi ni mu m.  No t e that  f or t hi s m odel  t he corr elati on bet w een the non-professional  and t he
professional  wa g e  i s ident i f i ed. St i l l  t he m axi mu m l i kel i hood procedure (of GAUSS)  has
probl em s to opt i mi se the l i kel i hood w i t h respect t o t hi s param eter.  As  t hi s param eter i s onl y
i dent i f i ed on  t he  basi s of  t he  dat a on  t he  professors,  and  t he  mi ni mu m  scale r estr i cti on  i s of  l i t t l e 
i m port ance f or  t he  professors,  t hi s i s not   a surpri se.  We   set  t hi s corr elati on  equal   t o  zero.  
Appendi xB:   Si mu l ati on result s
Thi s appendi x  di scusses t he  simu l ati ons  of  our  salary  scale m odel .   For   t he  salary  scale m odel   we  
present  t he r esult s f or  t he m odel   wi t h r estr i cti ons.   Re s ul t s shoul d t herefore be i nt erpreted as an 
upper bound,  since the m odel  is based on a sam ple excludi ng cert ain academ ics ( see di scussion 
f ol l ow i ng equat i on 1c,  secti on 4).  As  r eference academ ics w e choose t w o academ ics in soci al 
sciences;  one academ ic wi t h characteri sti cs close t o t he average l ecturer,   and one academ ic wi t h 
characteri sti cs close t o t he average senior l ecturer/ r eader.  Tabl es B .1 and B. 2 present t he
characteri sti cs of these reference academ ics. In our simu l ati on w e do not  restr i ct out com es to 
part i cular spinal  poi nt s, but  all ow  t hem  i nst ead to vary.  Be s i des calculati ng t he probabi l i t i es 
accordi ng  t o  di f f eri ng  spinal   poi nt s and  t he  r esult i ng  expected wa g e   f or  t he  r eference academ ics, 28
we  a l so calculate the i m pact on sal ary of an addit i onal  book,  chapter,  paper,  grant,  teaching
skil l s,  1 year  out - of-labour - f orce,  gender,   and gender  pl us 1 year  out -of- l abour-f orce.
We   f i r st  di scuss t he  simu l ati on  of  t he  r eference academ ics i n  t ables B. 1  and  B. 2.   Tabl e B1  show s 
a l ot   of  probabi l i t y  m ass at  spinal   poi nt s 11  and  18,   wh i ch mo s t   l i kel y  r epresents clust eri ng  at  t he 
t op of the l ecturer A  and l ecturer B  scales as indi vi dual s w ait  for prom ot i on t o t he next  salary 
scale. We  a l so fi nd a hi gh m ass i n poi nt s 12,  13 and 20.  In t able B .2 t he relevant hi gh m ass 
poi nt s are 18,   20,   24 and bei ng a professor.   The  predicted salari es seem  i n l i ne wi t h wh a t   mi ght  
be expected on t he basi s of  t he actual   salari es i n t he dat a. 
Al t hough t he vari ables on r esearch product i vi t y we r e hi ghl y signi f i cant  i n our  m odel ,   t he size of 
t hei r  im pact is m odest in our simu l ati ons.  A n addi t i onal  publ i shed book i ncreases t he expected 
w age by 0. 7 t o 0. 8 percent,  wh i l e an addit i onal  publ i shed paper increases the expect ed w age by 
0. 3  t o  0. 4  percent.   As t oni shing  i n  t hi s r espect  i s t he  i m pact  of  t eaching  skil l s,  a change t o  havi ng 
good  t eaching  skil l s i ncreases t he  expected salary  by  4. 1  t o  6. 2  percent.   For   our  second  r eference 
academ ic t hi s change i ncreases t he probabi l i t y of  bei ng professor  f r om  15. 1 t o 23. 8 percent.   An  
expl anati on f or  t hi s l arge eff ect  i s t hat   t he t eaching skil l   vari able also pi cks up ot her  skil l s,  l i ke 
present ati on skil l s.    Al so l arge i s t he i m pact  of  an out-of-the-l abour-force spell ,   a one-year  spell  
decreases t he  expected salary  by  1. 3  t o  1. 8  percent.   Al t hough  gender  i t self   wa s   not   signi f i cant  i n 
our m odel ,  t he si mu l ati ons show s t hat  t he i m pact of gender-r elated issues m ight  be
consi derabele. Changi ng our ma l e reference academ ics w it hout  an out- of-labour- f orce spell   i nt o 
wo ma n  wi t h a one year out-of- l abour-f orce spell   decreases, ceteris pari bus,   t he  expected salary 
by  2. 8  t o  3. 8  percent.  29
Tabl e  B. 1:  simu l ati ons  on  i ndi vi dual   and  product i vi t y  characteristi cs ( 1)
r ef er ence M al e  ci t i zen,   36  year s,   12  year s  exper i ence,   4  year s  t enur e,   no  t i m e-out-of-labour- f or ce
academ i c  1  =1   book,   2  chapt er s,   6  paper s,   2  gr ant s,   PhD,   no  t eachi ng  ski l l s
Scal er e f . + 1   book +1  chapt .+ 1   paper +1  gr ant +t ch. sk. +1  out -of wom an +1  out - of
40 . 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00
50 . 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00
60 . 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00
70 . 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00
80 . 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00
90 . 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00
10 4. 26 3. 99 4. 29 4. 14 4. 07 2. 85 4. 87 4. 95 5. 61
11 13. 89 13. 17 13. 95 13. 56 13. 38 10. 03 15. 44 15. 65 17. 24
12 10. 38 10. 00 10. 41 10. 21 10. 11 8. 18 11. 16 11. 27 12. 01
13 15. 85 15. 51 15. 88 15. 70 15. 61 13. 63 16. 50 16. 58 17. 12
14 2. 06 2. 03 2. 06 2. 05 2. 04 1. 88 2. 10 2. 10 2. 12
15 7. 44 7. 39 7. 44 7. 42 7. 41 7. 00 7. 49 7. 49 7. 48
16 3. 28 3. 28 3. 27 3. 28 3. 28 3. 19 3. 25 3. 25 3. 20
17 7. 62 7. 67 7. 61 7. 64 7. 66 7. 72 7. 45 7. 43 7. 21
18 14. 34 14. 67 14. 31 14. 50 14. 58 15. 89 13. 59 13. 48 12. 66
20 10. 10 10. 56 10. 06 10. 31 10. 43 12. 67 9. 13 9. 00 8. 07
21 4. 03 4. 29 4. 01 4. 15 4. 22 5. 62 3. 50 3. 44 2. 96
22 1. 45 1. 56 1. 44 1. 50 1. 53 2. 15 1. 23 1. 21 1. 02
23 0. 61 0. 66 0. 61 0. 63 0. 65 0. 93 0. 51 0. 50 0. 42
24 3. 21 3. 52 3. 18 3. 35 3. 43 5. 26 2. 63 2. 55 2. 07
25 0. 73 0. 81 0. 72 0. 77 0. 79 1. 35 0. 57 0. 55 0. 42
26 0. 20 0. 22 0. 19 0. 21 0. 21 0. 39 0. 15 0. 14 0. 11
27 0. 10 0. 11 0. 10 0. 11 0. 11 0. 20 0. 08 0. 07 0. 05
Pr of .0 . 47 0. 54 0. 46 0. 50 0. 52 1. 06 0. 34 0. 33 0. 23
Sal ar y
i n  £1, 000 23. 26 23. 42 23. 25 23. 33 23. 37 24. 21 22. 95 22. 91 22. 62
Dev i at i on
Per cent 0. 00 0. 65 -0. 06 0. 30 0. 47 4. 05 -1. 34 -1. 51 -2. 7630
Tabl e B. 2:  simu l ati ons  on  i ndi vi dual   and  product i vi t y  characteristi cs ( 2)
Ref er ence m al e  ci t i zen,   48  year s,   24  year s  exper i ence,   16  year s  t enur e,   no  t i m e-out-of-labour- f or ce
academ i c  2  =2   books,   4  chapt er s,   16  paper s,   6  gr ant s,   PhD,   no  t eachi ng  ski l l s
scal er ef .+ 1   book +1  chapt .+ 1   paper +1  gr ant +  t ch. sk +1  out -of wom an +1  out -of
40 . 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00
50 . 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00
60 . 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00
70 . 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00
80 . 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00
90 . 00 0.00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00
10 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00
11 1. 17 1. 03 1. 19 1. 11 1. 07 0. 55 1. 52 1. 57 2. 01
12 1. 36 1. 22 1. 38 1. 29 1. 26 0. 69 1. 71 1. 76 2. 18
13 3. 25 2. 96 3. 28 3. 12 3. 04 1. 81 3. 95 4. 05 4. 85
14 0. 56 0. 52 0. 57 0. 54 0. 53 0. 33 0. 67 0. 69 0. 80
15 2. 39 2. 21 2. 41 2. 31 2. 26 1. 45 2. 82 2. 88 3. 33
16 1. 27 1. 18 1. 27 1. 22 1. 20 0. 80 1. 47 1. 50 1. 71
17 3. 60 3. 36 3. 62 3. 49 3. 43 2. 35 4. 11 4. 18 4. 71
18 10. 73 10. 20 10. 78 10. 49 10. 35 7. 70 11. 85 12. 00 13. 05
20 14. 28 13. 87 14. 32 14. 09 13. 99 11. 62 15. 05 15. 14 15. 72
21 9. 65 9. 54 9. 66 9. 60 9. 58 8. 69 9. 79 9. 80 9. 80
22 4. 68 4. 68 4. 68 4. 68 4. 68 4. 46 4. 65 4. 64 4. 54
23 2. 27 2. 28 2. 27 2. 27 2. 28 2. 22 2. 23 2. 22 2. 15
24 17. 85 18. 18 17. 82 18. 01 18. 09 19. 04 17. 00 16. 88 15. 84
25 7. 50 7. 80 7. 47 7. 64 7. 71 8. 99 6. 83 6. 74 6. 05
26 2. 72 2. 85 2. 70 2. 78 2. 82 3. 45 2. 42 2. 38 2. 10
27 1. 59 1. 68 1. 58 1. 63 1. 65 2. 07 1. 40 1. 38 1. 20
Pr of . 15. 12 16. 46 14. 99 15. 71 16. 06 23. 77 12. 51 12. 18 9. 96
Sal ar y
i n  £1, 000 29. 34 29. 57 29. 31 29. 45 29. 53 31. 14 28. 81 28. 74 28. 22
Dev i at i on
Per cent 0. 00 0. 81 -0.10 0. 39 0. 64 6. 16 -1.81 -2. 05 -3. 8231
Appendi x  C:   C om parabl e w age  regressions
I n t hi s appendi x we   calculate str aight f orwa r d wa g e   r egression t o com pare t hem  t o t he r esult s of 
our spinal  poi nt  and sal ary scale m odel .  De f i ne w i  as the nat ural logari t hm  of the sal ary of 
i ndi vi dual  i ,x i  as a vector of expl anatory vari ables, β as a param eter vector,  and εi
w as an 
i ndi vi dual   di sturbance t erm.
( B. 1) w i     =  x i ’ β  + εi
w
The OLS r esult s are given i n t able C .1.  W e consi der salary det ermi nat i on of our ful l  sam ple of 
academ ics,  of  academ ics excludi ng  professors and  of  professors onl y.   No t e t hat   t he  r esult s of  t he 
l ast  t wo   r egressions  shoul d  be  i nt erpreted wi t h  care,  as selecti on  eff ects pl ay  a  r ol e. 
For   t he  f ul l   sam ple we   r eveal  an i nsi gni f i cant  r ew ard  t o  ma l e academ ics above  f em ale.  As   f or  t he 
salary scale m odel ,  excludi ng t he product i vi t y vari ables fr om  t he analysi s reveals a signi f i cant 
gender - wa g e   gap  at  a one  percent  signi f i cance l evel.   Experi ence i s posi t i vel y  r ew arded  and  spell s 
out side  t he  l abour  ma r ket   have  a signi f i cantl y  negat i ve  eff ect  on  academ ic salari es.  A cadem ics i n 
He r i ot - Wa t t  experi ence a signi f i cant salary advant age relati ve t o t he excluded uni versit y
Gl asgow .  Result s reveal signi f i cantl y posi t i ve rew ards t o product i vi t y vari ables such as the
num ber of books and papers publ i shed, grants aw arded and hi gh t eaching abi l i t y.  Ov e r all  the 
concl usi ons  are i n  l i ne  wi t h  t he  r esult s f r om   t he  salary  scale m odel .  
Compa r i son of t hese result s w it h t hose of academ ics excludi ng professors reveals simi l ar 
pat t erns,  alt hough t he rew ard t o t enure is now  signi f i cant.  As  s t ated in t he begi nni ng of thi s 
paragraph,   t he  r esult s shoul d  be  t aken wi t h  care as selecti on  eff ects mi ght   pl ay a ma j or  r ol e here. 
For  academ ics w it h m uch experi ence, tenure, and publ i cati ons,  becom ing professor is a li kel y 
event.  As  t he professors are excluded,  t he i m pact of t hese vari ables m ight  be bi ased
consi derably.  The sam e hol ds for t he regression on t he w ages of the professors. No t i ce the 
negat i ve i m pact of t he num ber of books w ri t t en, and al so the n-shaped eff ect of t enure is
negat i ve aft er  8 years.  Al t hough t hi s r esult   i s i n l i ne wi t h Ransom  ( 1993),   i t   does not   seem  very 
r easonabl e t o  draw  str ong  concl usi ons on t he basi s of  t hese r esult s.32
Tabl e C. 1:  Es t i ma t i on  result s of  w age  regressions
                  Ful l   sam pl e                              Excl ud.   Pr of essors                        Pr of essors  onl y
            ( 635  obs. )    ( 544  obs. )      ( 91  obs. )
par .s . e par .s . e. par .s . e.
I ndi vi dual   char .
I nt er cept 9. 5323 ***(0. 0270) 9. 5565 ***(0. 0236) 10. 4829 ***(0. 1708)
G ender 0. 0243 ( 0. 0149) 0. 0010 ( 0. 0127) -0. 0637 ( 0. 0827)
Ci t i zen 0.0263 ( 0. 0190) 0. 0094 ( 0. 0161) -0. 0229 ( 0. 0643)
Job  char .
Exper i ence 0. 0329 ***(0.0025) 0. 0267 ***(0. 0023) 0. 0057 ( 0. 0093)
Exper i ence² / 10 - 0. 0045 ***(0. 0006) -0. 0039 ***(0. 0006) 0. 0001 ( 0. 0016)
Tenur e0 . 0029 ( 0. 0027) 0. 0122 ***(0. 0026) 0. 0043 ( 0. 0042)
Tenur e² / 10 - 0. 0011 ( 0. 0009) -0. 0028 ***(0. 0008) -0. 0027 **( 0. 0013)
Ti me- out - 0. 0171 ***(0. 0037) -0. 0116 ***(0. 0031) -0. 0642 ( 0. 0425)
Uni versi t y
Aber deen 0. 0254 ( 0. 0185) 0. 0219 ( 0. 0172) 0. 0338 ( 0. 0335)
Dundee - 0. 0050 ( 0. 0162) 0. 0110 ( 0. 0142) -0. 0047 ( 0. 0422)
Her i ot -W att s0 . 0599 **( 0. 0262) 0. 0685 ***(0. 0250) -0. 0054 ( 0. 0408)
St . Andr ews - 0. 0008 ( 0. 0180) -0. 0041 ( 0. 0162) 0. 0716 **( 0. 0334)
Facul t y
Ar t s0 . 0089 ( 0. 0184) 0. 0111 ( 0. 0166) -0. 0287 ( 0. 0355)
Engi neer - 0. 0302 ( 0. 0199) -0. 0379 **( 0. 0178) 0. 0328 ( 0. 0422)
M edi ci ne 0. 0090 ( 0. 0199) 0. 0020 ( 0.0177) 0. 0759 *( 0. 0447)
Soc. Sci ence 0. 0500 ***(0. 0191) 0. 0428 **( 0. 0176) -0. 0122 ( 0. 0348)
Publ i cat i ons
Books  /   aver age  by  f ac. 0. 0096 ***(0. 0032) 0. 0060 ( 0. 0040) -0. 0061 *( 0. 0034)
Chapt .   /   aver age  by  f ac. - 0. 0013 ( 0. 0025) 0. 0005 ( 0. 0025) -0. 0036 ( 0. 0040)
Paper s  /   aver age  by  f ac. 0. 0443 ***(0. 0058) 0. 0325 ***(0. 0074) 0. 0025 ( 0. 0064)
Ot her
Gr ant s  /   aver age  by  f ac. 0. 0231 ***(0. 0045) 0. 0165 ***(0. 0045) 0. 0103 ( 0. 0068)
Hav i ng  PhD 0. 0246 *( 0. 0146) 0. 0449 ***(0. 0132) -0. 0494 ( 0. 0311)
Teach. ski l l0 . 0566 ***(0. 0157) 0. 0507 ***(0. 0147) 0. 0480 *( 0. 0268)